Abstract. Let C be a curve of genus g, defined over a finite field Fq, where q = p m for a prime p. Let N be a large integer coprime to p, dividing the order of the Jacobian variety associated to C. Pairings can transport the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) from the curve to a finite field where there are more efficient methods for solving the discrete logarithm. The embedding degree is defined to be the smallest positive integer k such that N divides q k − 1. We show that the minimal embedding field is not necessarily F q k , as is traditionally understood, but rather is F p ord N p = F q ord N p/m , which can be a field of significantly smaller size. This fact reveals that attacks on the DLP can be dramatically faster than otherwise expected, so a parameter separate from the embedding degree k needs to be used to indicate security.
Introduction
The use of elliptic curves over finite fields in public-key cryptography provides greater security and more efficient performance than first generation public key techniques, such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman. Hyperelliptic curves of small genus (that is, the associated Jacobian abelian varieties with low dimension) are also believed to offer the benefits of having comparable levels of security with smaller key sizes than other finite abelian groups. Pairings on groups have been used constructively to design cryptographic protocols and to solve problems that have been open for many years, such as identity-based encryption, one-round three-party key agreement, and short signatures. On the other hand, pairings have been used destructively to attack cryptographic security. For example, the Frey-Rück attack (or MOV attack) uses the Tate pairing (or Weil pairing) to map the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on the Jacobian of a curve to the discrete logarithm in the finite field F * q k , where there are more efficient methods for solving the DLP. So for pairing-based cryptosystems, it is important to find curves where the embedding degree k is small enough that the pairing is efficiently computable, but large enough that the DLP in F enough to enable pairings in the group, if it is too small, then the embedding field F q k is small enough to warrant the curve insecure for DL systems.
We show that pairing can embed into the field F p ord N p , not merely into F q k , which can dramatically speed up attacks on the DLP. The possible difference in the size of the fields has the implication in theory that there could be curves used in DL systems that are presently regarded as secure against pairing-based attacks, but are in fact insecure. That is, there could be "pairing-friendly" curves that may not be as secure as previously believed.
Published literature does not properly recognize and discuss this difference between the minimal embedding field and the field indicated by the embedding degree k. In fact, the following quote in [1] is an example of the misleading portrayal that appears in the literature.
Let q be a prime power, and let E/F q be an elliptic curve with m points in E(F q ). Let P in E(F q ) be a point of prime order p where p 2 m. We say that the subgroup < P > has a security multiplier α, for some integer α > 0, if the order of q in F * p is α.
The MOV method can, at best, reduce the discrete log problem in < P > to a discrete log problem in a subgroup of F * q α . Therefore, to ensure that discrete log is hard in < P > we want curves where α is sufficiently large to make discrete log in F * q α intractable.
Our paper shows that one needs not a positive integer k with q k − 1 divisible by the size of the large prime-order subgroup; rather, it suffices to have a positive rational number k with q k − 1 divisible by the prime. In particular, if q = p m , then this rational number will be ord N p m . Rubin and Silverberg in [8] recognize that there may be a difference between the size of the field F q k and the actual embedding field for supersingular abelian varieties. They show that for supersingular abelian varieties, the difference in the size of the exponent can be at most a factor of two. Our observation is not limited to the supersingular case and explains that the difference in the fields is related to the order of the characteristic modulo the prime N , not merely on the dimension of the variety. We see that for curves of any genus, the difference in the size of the exponent can be unbounded, though it only impacts non-prime fields of small characteristic.
In section 2, we give a preliminary framework and examine the bounds on k for pairingbased attacks to be sub-exponential in q. In section 3, we discuss the underlying mathematics that causes the embedding degree of a curve to not necessarily correspond to the minimal embedding field, and hence why it may fail to capture the security of a pairing-based cryptosystem. We show that for a curve of any genus defined over F q , the pairing in a group of order N embeds in a field that is not necessarily an extension of F q , but merely of F p (where q = p m ). In particular, the embedding field is F p ord N p . We measure the difference in size of the field exponents, finding that it grows with m. We advocate the use of two separate parameters: an embedding degree to indicate the field one must work over to compute the pairing, and a security parameter, such as k = ord N p mg , to indicate the minimal field containing the embedding. We then examine the bounds for attacks to be sub-exponential in the group size of the curve in light of this understanding of the minimal embedding field. Finally, in section 4, we give examples of curves that demonstrate when the embedding degree k does not correspond to the minimal embedding field and hence is a poor assessment of security. Although these curves have not been chosen for practical implementation, we hope that, for mathematical completeness, subsequent literature will acknowledge the possible difference between the field suggested by embedding degree and the actual minimal embedding field.
Preliminaries
Let F q be a finite field with q = p m for some prime p and positive integer m, and let C be a curve over F q . The Jacobian of the curve is an abelian variety, J C , of dimension g defined over F q . Let N be an integer dividing the order of
The Tate pairing is a (bilinear, non-degenerate) function
One can then map F * q k /F * N q k isomorphically into the set of N th roots of unity, µ N , by raising the image to the power
N . Pairing-based attacks can transport the discrete logarithm problem in J C (F q ) to the discrete logarithm in the finite field F * q k , where there are sub-exponential methods for solving the DLP. So for pairing-based cryptosystems, one would like to find curves where the embedding degree k is small enough for computations to be feasible, but large enough for the DLP in the embedding field to be difficult. We know that k ≤ 6 for supersingular elliptic curves, as first shown in [6] , and [3] gives an upper bound of 12 on k for supersingular genus 2 curves. However, for most non-supersingular curves, k is enormous since k = ord N q.
The best generic algorithm known for solving the DLP is Pollard's rho method, which has a fully-exponential expected running time. For particular groups, pairing-based attacks with index-calculus methods yield sub-exponential-time algorithms. The latest results, in [5] , give an algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in finite fields F q k with heuristic complexity
). So in order for an attack to be sub-exponential in q, one needs k ∈ o(( log q log log q ) 2 ). Galbraith in [3] noted that the size of the group J C (F q ) is approximately q g , so to determine the applicability of the subexponential algorithms for solving the DLP in finite fields, one should actually consider k/g.
An Examination of the Embedding Degree
Given a subgroup of order N of a curve over F q , the standard definition of the embedding degree k is that k is the smallest integer such that N | q k −1. Since the MOV attack first used pairings to transport the discrete log problem on the curve to the discrete log problem in F * q k , where one can perform index calculus, the security of a cryptosystem has been assumed to be related to the size of this parameter k.
However, we point out that to properly determine the security level of a pairing-based cryptosystem, it is important to know the minimal field containing the N th roots of unity and to incorporate this exponent as a security parameter. If q = p m , then the pairings embed into µ N which lies in F * p ord N p , not merely in F * q k . That is, the embedding is into the multiplicative group of an extension of F p , which is not necessarily an extension of F q . This difference in the size of the groups can be quite large, by as much as a factor of m.
Let us examine the present definition of embedding degree with respect to a general prime N over F q . We let ord N p be the smallest positive integer x such that p x ≡ 1 mod N .
Lemma N p, m) .
We also know that ord N p | mk, and this implies
and the proof is complete.
Since µ N lies in F * p ord N p , it is apparent that the embedding field is not
So it is conceivable for the size of the actual and presumed embedding fields to differ by a factor of m.
The following field diagram helps to illustrate the difference in these fields of discussion.
F q k presumed embedding field k
ord N pF p We note that it is possible for this gap to be as large as one dictates, simply by increasing the exponent m prime to ord N p.
We see that the term "embedding degree" is a bit of a misnomer, as the minimal embedding field is not necessarily the one indicated by the embedding degree. We suggest a separate parameter be used to indicate security against solving the DLP in the finite field. In security analysis, one wants to compare the difficulty of solving the DLP in the minimal embedding field with solving the DLP in the curve group, as both should be computationally intractable. The size of the Jacobian of a genus g curve over F q is approximately q g , so [3] suggests k/g should be considered for security, as this represents the logarithmic ratio between the size of the finite field F q k and the size of the curve group. In light of our observation, we now suggest k = ord N p mg is a more accurate indicator, as it takes into account the minimal embedding field. Whenever q is prime, then there is no difference between presumed and actual minimal embedding field sizes, so in that case we have k = mgk .
Roughly speaking, for cryptographic security one needs the size of the minimal embedding field to be of approximately 1024 bits to avoid index calculus computations, and the prime N should be approximately 160 bits so that the DLP in the curve group is suitably hard. Pairing-based systems become much slower as q k increases, so one normally chooses q k just barely large enough to have hard discrete logarithms in the field F q k . Suppose an elliptic curve is defined over q = p 2 , such that q k is larger than 2 1024 , as is the conventional custom. If q 5/2 − 1 is divisible by N , then the Tate pairing in F q 5 actually produces a result in F q 5/2 . Computing the DLP in this field is dramatically faster than in F q 5 . It is likely that the original curve was not chosen to have q 5/2 larger than 2 1024 , so we now realize the curve was insecure. Thus the standard practice of checking traditional embedding degrees needs to be modified in light of this observation of the minimal embedding field.
To examine the potential difference between the size of the minimal field that contains the embedding and the one under the conventional notion of embedding degree, let q = p Since the minimal embedding field is F p ord N p = F p kD , where D = gcd(ord N p, m), we see that an attack will now be sub-exponential in q if k ∈ o(
(log log p ord N p ) 2 ). So clearly more curves will be susceptible to pairing attacks than previously anticipated.
Examples
Let us look at some examples of genus 1 and genus 2 curves that clearly emphasize this difference between the size of the minimal embedding field and the field suggested by the conventional notion of embedding degree. Since cryptographic applications usually focus on prime fields and binary fields, and this difference in the minimal embedding field is only visible in the extension field case, we will give examples in characteristic 2. Although these curves may not be chosen for practical implementation, we hope subsequent literature will acknowledge the possibility of having a smaller embedding field in certain situations. Example 1. Let N = 2 p −1, and q = 2 p+s , for 1 ≤ s ≤ p+1, s = p. We know from [9] that for each s, there exists at least one non-supersingular elliptic curve over F q with |E(F q )| = 2 s N . We emphasize that this allows for the extension degree to be prime, so Weil descent attacks do not apply. These curves have embedding degree k = p, which suggests that the embedding field is F q k = F 2 p(p+s) . But in fact, gcd(ord N 2, p + s) = 1, so the embedding field is F 2 p , and these sizes differ by a factor of ∆ = p + s. We see that in this case the "presumed" embedding field grows quadratically in p, but the actual minimal embedding field grows only linearly in p.
We note that Appendix A of [7] , which develops standard specifications for public-key cryptography, states a condition that one needs only to test whether the embedding degree is larger than some small integer B, and the largest B stated is 28. So the curves in Example 1 could have been considered as secure for DL systems, but in light of this paper's observations, we see that the resulting field size is smaller than q, with embedding degree 1, so the DLP is easy to break.
Example 2. We can consider the Mersenne prime N = 2 p − 1 for genus 2 curves as well, as in [4] . We note that these examples have an absolutely simple Jacobian, so these curves are not merely the product of an elliptic curve from Example 1 and another elliptic curve. For each 2p 3 ≤ m ≤ p − 1, there exists a genus 2 curve over F 2 m with #J C (F 2 m ) = 2 2m−p N . Each curve is given by the Weil polynomial with coefficients (a 1 , a 2 ) = (−1, 2 m − 2 2m−p ). These curves have embedding degree k = p, which suggests that the embedding field is F q k = F 2 pm , but in fact the embedding field is F 2 p , since gcd(ord N 2, m) = 1. One might previously have considered these curves as secure for DL systems, but we now see the DLP is easy to break.
This observation of the misleading notion of embedding degree has motivated us to check the accuracy of k as a security parameter in curve examples in the published literature. The following is an actually proposed system in [2] which is insecure due to the observations we have mentioned above.
Example 3 (from published literature). The authors of [2] propose a family of genus 2 curves over F q where q(l) = l 2 for any prime (power) l. The associated Jacobian variety has size n(l) = l 4 ± l 3 + l 2 ± l + 1. A prime N dividing n(l) clearly divides q 5 − 1, but cannot divide q k − 1 for k < 5 except in the absurdly small case of N = 5. So every curve of this form has embedding degree k = 5, as shown in [2] . However, if n(l) = l 4 + l 3 + l 2 + l + 1, then N divides l 5 − 1 = q 5/2 − 1, so in fact the minimal embedding field cannot be larger than F q 5/2 . This makes a dramatic difference in how large l has to be chosen for the curves to remain secure against pairing-based attacks. However no such security warning is present in [2] .
As we have mentioned, whenever working over F q , for q a prime, there is no discrepancy between the mathematical and cryptographic notions of embedding degree, but when q is a prime power there may be a significant difference. The techniques given in [2] are presented in general for prime powers q, although most of the curves examples they list are over a prime field, and hence escape the discrepancy. One should be cautious when using these techniques to generate curves, as certain parameters may yield a prime power q, and hence the curves could be insecure in light of our observation.
We now give two numerical examples taken from [4] . Though these curves are not used in practice, they serve to illustrate our observation. is prime, and the embedding degree is k = 8. So we have a 351-bit DLP on the curve, and a 2136-bit DLP in F * q k , which is considered hard. However, in the minimal embedding field, we have only a 712-bit DLP, which is considered easy. is prime, and the embedding degree is k = 37. So we have a 5032-bit DLP in F * q k , which is considered hard. However, in the minimal embedding field, we have only a 296-bit DLP, which is considered easy.
Conclusion
We have shown that the minimal embedding field is not F q k , but F q ord N p/m = F p kD , where D = gcd(ord N p, m). It is of critical importance to check when working over fields of small characteristic, though the observation of this paper does not affect the case of prime fields. We advocate the use of two separate parameters: the traditional embedding degree 1 k to indicate the field one must work over to compute the pairing, and a security parameter, k = ord N p mg , to indicate the difficulty of solving the DLP in the minimal finite field containing the embedding.
